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ABSTRACT
The plight of a refugee is one that many of us will never understand.
However, the ugly truth is that there is a global rise in the number of displaced
persons seeking asylum. By the end of 2015, the number of displaced 
persons surpassed post World War II numbers, prompting developed nations 
around the world to enforce, amend, or implement policies targeted at 
controlling the flood of refugees at their borders. This Comment examines
the policies of Australia, a nation that has had strict immigration policies 
in place for decades. Specifically, it discusses the Australian stance on refugee
migration and how such policy reconciles with human rights obligations
imposed by international treaties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Australia’s Pacific Solution is the country’s answer to decades of displaced 
migrants landing on its shores seeking asylum. First arising in an official 
capacity in 2001, the Pacific Solution’s goal was to prevent asylum seekers 
arriving by boat from entering Australian territory.  Australian government 
officials would detain migrants attempting to reach Australian shores by
boat. Migrants would then be rerouted to processing facilities in Nauru or
Papua New Guinea where their asylum claims were processed and their status 
as refugees was determined.  However, even if granted refugee status, migrants 
were still not permitted to resettle on Australian soil. 
By 2008, subsequent administrations had put an end to the Pacific 
Solution, only to see an even more restrictive version revived in 2012. 
Australian officials defend it as necessary to deter people smugglers and
to save lives at sea.1  Others, however, criticize it as a harsh response to a
global migration crisis.2  Amnesty International has said the Australian
government has chosen “intolerable cruelty” as a tool to further its policy to
deter boat arrivals; a method that puts Australia in breach of international
 1. See generally Elaine Pearson, Australia’s harsh refugee policy is no global model, 
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human rights laws and international refugee laws.3 As of February 2016, the
Australian High Court has upheld the legality of the Pacific Solution despite
its controversial terms.  However, a recent decision from the Supreme
Court of Papua New Guinea, coupled with an announcement that detention 
centers on Manus Island will close, threaten the future of the Pacific
Solution.4 
As a signatory to virtually every major human rights agreement, Australia
is facing allegations that its Pacific Solution violates international law.5 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) is an international
document enshrining the basic rights, including civil, political, economic, 
and cultural rights, and fundamental freedoms to which all human beings 
are entitled.6  The UDHR was adopted in 1948 as a result of events related
to World War II and was proposed as a type of road map for the newly
created United Nations to guarantee the rights of all individuals.7 The 
3. AMNESTY INT’L, ISLAND OF DESPAIR: AUSTRALIA’S “PROCESSING” OF REFUGEES ON
NAURU 7 (2016), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1249342016
ENGLISH.PDF [https://perma.cc/UWS4-R856] [hereinafter Island of Despair] (“The 
inescapable conclusion is that the abuse and anguish that constitutes the daily reality of 
refugees and asylum-seekers on Nauru is the express intention of the Government of Australia. In
furtherance of a policy to deter people arriving in Australia by boat, the Government of 
Australia has made a calculation in which intolerable cruelty and the destruction of the 
physical and mental integrity of hundreds of children, men and women, have been chosen as a
tool of government policy. In so doing the Government of Australia is in breach of 
international human rights law and international refugee law.”).  
4. See generally Namah v. Pato, SCA. No. 84 of 2013, SC1497, 1, 27 (Papua N.G.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGSC/2016/13.pdf  [https://perma.cc/
QFK8-W4H2] (ruling that detention of asylum seekers in Papua New Guinea is unconstitutional).
Kelly Buchanan, Australia/Nauru: High Court Rules Offshore Detention of Asylum
Seekers Is Lawful, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.loc.gov/ law/foreign­
news/article/australianauru-high-court-rules-offshore-detention-of-asylum-seekers-is­
lawful/ [https://perma.cc/4VRA-SVMA].
5. The list of international agreements to which Australia is a party includes: The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Jared L. Lacertosa, Note, Unfriendly Shores: 
An Examination of Australia’s “Pacific Solution” Under International Law, 40 BROOKLYN J.
INT’L L. 321, 323 (2014). 
6. What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMM’N, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/what-universal-declaration-human­
rights [https://perma.cc/J6L3-7XJ4] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016); see generally G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
7. History of the Document, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/
universal-declaration/history-document/  [https://perma.cc/ AX2G-AJTQ] (last visited Oct. 16,
2016). 
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UDHR is a declaration rather than a treaty, meaning it is not legally binding 
on countries.  However, some argue that it has become binding as a part 
of customary international law.8 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugees 
Convention”) is grounded in Article 14 of the UDHR, recognizing the right
of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other countries.9  It provides
minimum standards for the treatment of refugees and is underpinned by 
three fundamental principles: non-discrimination, non-penalization, and
non-refoulement.10  The Refugees Convention was originally limited in
scope to cover persons fleeing from events taking place in Europe before 
January 1, 1951,11 but in 1967, the Refugees Protocol expanded the Refugees
Convention’s definition of “refugee” to apply universally.12 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)13 
is a treaty comprised of basic, fundamental human rights including the
right of self-determination, the right to life, the right to be free from inhumane
punishment, and the right to be free from slavery.14  The ICCPR serves as 
a “yardstick” for drafting laws related to fundamental rights.15 
This Comment will examine the current and future state of the Pacific 
Solution and suggest how Australia might respond to the recent threats
posed to its policy.  Part II provides a historical framework of Australia’s 
policy towards asylum seekers and refugees who arrive by boat. Part III
 8. AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 6. 
9.  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Introductory Note from the Office of the
UNHCR to the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 2 (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10 [https://perma. cc/KZ5W-FG7H] [hereinafter UNHCR
Introductory Note] .
10. Id. at 3; see generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, 
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (“No Contracting State shall expel or return
(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion.”); “non-refoulement” is defined as “a principle of
international law providing a refugee or asylum seeker with the right to freedom from
expulsion from a territory in which he or she seeks refuge or from forcible return to a 
country or territory where he or she faces threats to life or freedom because of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Non-refoulement, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/non-refoulement
[https://perma.cc/MXJ4-GNWP] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018). 
11. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
606 U.N.T.S. 268; UNHCR Introductory Note, supra note 9, at 3. 
12. UNHCR Introductory Note, supra note 9, at 2, 4.
13. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19, 
1966).
14. Christian Tomuschat, Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at 2, U.N. 
AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW (2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/iccpr/iccpr_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WJ6U-FTCS].
15. Id. at 3. 
374
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discusses how the Pacific Solution may threaten Australia’s adherence to 
its international obligations.  Specifically, Part III will examine three key
aspects of the policy that may cause it to infringe on Australia’s international 
obligations: its statutory construction, its purpose and procedures, and the
living conditions of the facilities that carry out the policy. Part IV will address 
the April 2016 announcement that detention centers will close on Papua 
New Guinea’s Manus Island and how it might affect Australian policy 
moving forward.  Finally, Part V proposes steps that Australia should take 
to ensure the safe resettlement of the refugees currently being held in offshore 
detention centers. 
II. THE CREATION OF THE PACIFIC SOLUTION
Australia’s current policy towards asylum seekers who arrive by boat is 
most commonly referred to as the “Pacific Solution.”  To fully understand
this policy, it is important to have a clear view of its historical framework 
and evolution. The policy has become increasingly more restrictive over the 
decades.  The migration of “boat people” to Australia first began following 
the Vietnam War,16 a conflict where more than three million people were 
displaced.17  As the number of arrivals increased, so did a perception of a 
loss of border control.18  In reality, however, only 2,059 asylum seekers arrived 
by boat between 1976 and 1979.19  By 1982, the arrivals had dropped to
zero and did not pick up again until 1989.20  Despite these statistics, the
Australian government passed legislation in 1989 that permitted officers
to detain migrants who attempted to enter Australia without a valid visa.21 
The detentions were meant to be temporary, lasting only until the migrant’s
immigration status was resolved.22  Finally, in 2001, the Pacific Solution 
16. Kaitlyn Pennington-Hill, Note, The Legal Challenges of Globalization: A View from
the Heartland: Note: Australia Makes a U-Turn with the Revival of the Pacific Solution: Should
Asylum Seekers Find a New Destination?, in THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION: A VIEW 
FROM THE HEARTLAND, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 585, 587 (2014). 
17.  Giada Zampano et al., Migrant Crisis: A History of Displacement, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/migrant-crisis-history-of-displacement/ [http://
perma.cc/X5B4-CMNF].
18. Pennington-Hill, supra note 16. 
19. Bridie Jabour, Did John Howard’s Pacific Solution stop the boats, as Tony Abbott 
Asserts?, THE GUARDIAN (July 19, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/ 
19/did-howard-solution-stop-boats [https://perma.cc/R24B-E7S6]. 
20. Id.
 21. Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 589. 
22. Id.
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was officially implemented following what is now known as the Tampa 
Affair.
A. The Tampa Affair
In 2001, the “Tampa Affair” or “Tampa Crisis”23 occurred, changing the
tone of Australian immigration policy. Giving rise to the name, the following
chain of events occurred. An Indonesian boat, carrying 433, primarily Afghan
asylum-seekers, became stranded in international waters about 140 kilometers 
north of the Australian territory of Christmas Island.24 Under the direction
of the Australian Maritime Safety Administration, a Norwegian container 
ship known as the MV Tampa (“Tampa”) rescued the stranded asylum
seekers.25 
Following the rescue, the Tampa headed back to Indonesia, the closest
port, but when asylum seekers threatened suicide, the Tampa changed course
and headed back towards Christmas Island.26  The Australian government 
refused to allow the Tampa to dock and unload the asylum seekers.27 Rather, 
the Australian government advised Arne Rinnan, the Tampa’s Captain, 
that if he docked and attempted to disembark the asylum seekers, he would
be subject to prosecution for human smuggling.28 
Many of asylum seekers on board were in poor health and the Tampa 
was ill-equipped to provide even basic services to its rescued passengers.29 
After making repeated assistance requests to Australian authorities to no 
avail, Captain Rinnan crossed the Australian maritime border.30  The Australian 
government responded by dispatching Special Air Services to board the ship 
and prevent it from sailing any closer to Christmas Island or disembarking 
the asylum seekers.31  The Australian government then made arrangements
with the countries of Nauru and New Zealand to process the asylum seekers.32 
The Australian government’s response during the Tampa Affair solidified 
its stance on unwanted migration.  Not only did the Australian government
 23. Defining Moments in Australian History, Tampa affair, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AUSTL., 
http://www.nma.gov.au/online_features/defining_moments/featured/tampa_affair  [https://perma.
cc/3NVQ-VFBS] (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
24. Id.
 25. Id.
 26. NAT’L MUSEUM OF AUSTL., supra note 23; Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 
591. 
27. NAT’L MUSEUM OF AUSTL., supra note 23. 
28. Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 592. 
29. NAT’L MUSEUM OF AUSTL., supra note 23; Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 
592. 
30. NAT’L MUSEUM OF AUSTL., supra note 23. 
31. NAT’L MUSEUM OF AUSTL., supra note 23; Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 592.
 32. NAT’L MUSEUM OF AUSTL., supra note 23. 
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forbid the Tampa from entering its territorial waters, it ignored pleas for 
humanitarian assistance.  It further criminalized the actions of Captain Rinnan
who was left with no other choice but to approach Australian territory to 
save the lives of his passengers.33 After taking the drastic action of mobilizing 
military forces for the sole purpose of preventing entry by asylum seekers,
the government then refused to process their asylum claims, opting instead to
export the responsibility to willing sister nations.34 
As a result of the Tampa Affair, the Australian government passed three 
key pieces of legislation35 relating to the handling of asylum seekers,36 
collectively labeled the “Pacific Solution.”37  The first piece of legislation 
passed was the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers)
Act 2001 (“Border Protection Act 2001”).38  The Border Protection Act 2001 
retroactively and unambiguously validated the actions taken by the Australian 
government during the Tampa Affair.39  It also made any future detention
of a ship and restraint on any liberty of those on board the vessel lawful action. 
Moreover, the Act foreclosed detainees from initiating civil or criminal
proceedings against the Australian government or any person assisting in
the detention.40 
The second piece of legislation passed was the Migration Amendment 
(Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (“Migration Zone Act”).41  The 
purpose of the Migration Zone Act was to “excise certain Australian territory 
from the migration zone . . . for purposes related to unauthorized arrivals
[.  . .].”42 The Act effectively removed the Australian territories of Christmas 
Island, Ashmore Island, Cartier Island, and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands 
from Australia’s migration zone, thus limiting the ability of “offshore entry
persons” to make valid visa applications if they were to land on one of these 
territories.43
 33. See Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 592. 
34. See NAT’L MUSEUM OF AUSTL., supra note 23.
 35. Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 593. 
36. NAT’L MUSEUM OF AUSTL., supra note 23. 
37. Id.
 38. Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); 
Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 593. 
39. Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth) pt 2
subsec. 5 (Austl.). 
40. Id. at pt 2 subsec. 8.
41. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.);
Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 593. 
42. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.). 
43. Id. at sch 1.
 377
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The Migration Zone Act made it clear that any visa application made by an
offshore entry person will not be valid44 unless the Immigration Minister, at
his discretion, determines otherwise.45 The Immigration Minister, however, 
has no duty under the act to consider exercising that discretionary power with 
respect to any offshore entry person.46  In other words, any asylum seeker 
who lands on either Australian shores or shores of an Australian territory
will not be able to subsequently apply for a visa, and the Minister has no 
duty to review any application.  Thus, even a subsequently bona fide refugee 
can be legally prevented from entering Australia if he or she had first arrived
by boat. 
The third and final piece of legislation passed as part of the Pacific Solution 
was the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential 
Provisions) Act 2001 (“Consequential Provisions Act”).47 The Consequential 
Provisions Act, as implemented in 2001, permits Australian officials to detain
and remove an offshore entry person to a declared country.48  To declare 
a country, the Minister would assert in writing that the country:
1.	 provides access for persons seeking asylum, to effective 
procedures for assessing their needs for protection; and 
2.	 provides protection for persons seeking asylum, pending
determination of their refugee status; and
3.	 provides protection to persons who are given refugee status,
pending their voluntary repatriation to their country of origin
or resettlement in another country; and 
4.	 meets relevant human rights standards in providing that 
protection.49 
Following the enactment of Consequential Provisions Act, the Australian
government negotiated agreements with Papua New Guinea and Nauru, 
to make each a declared country that would admit asylum seekers.50 Under
these agreements, asylum seekers who arrived on Australian soil or in the 
44. Id.; Migration Act 1958, s 46A, subsec. 1 (Austl.). 
45. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1 
(Austl.); Migration Act 1958, s 46A subsec. 2 (Austl.). 
46. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1 
(Austl.); Migration Act 1958, s 46A, subsec. 7 (Austl.). 
47. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) 
Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 593. 
48. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) 
Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.); Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 594. 
49. This amendment created section 198A under the Migration Act 1958 which was 
later repealed under the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and
Other Measures) Act 2012. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) 
(Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1 pt 6 (Austl.). 
50. Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 595. 
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excised territories would be transferred to processing centers on Nauru
and Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island where they would be detained while
their asylum claims were assessed.51 
This version of the Pacific Solution remained in place until 2008.  In 2002, 
one year after the Pacific Solution was introduced, only one boat carrying
a single asylum seeker arrived, while only several hundred asylum seekers
arrived between 2003 and 2008.52  In sum, from 2001 until 2008, a total 
of 1,322 asylum seekers, most of whom were from Afghanistan and Iraq, 
were detained on Nauru and a total of 315 asylum seekers detained on Manus
Island.53  Although on the surface the Pacific Solution may have appeared 
successful in achieving its goal of deterring boat arrivals, asylum seekers
continued to arrive by air at a rate of about 4,000 people per year.54 
Moreover, in 2011, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) commented there was no empirical evidence giving credence
to the assumption that the threat of being detained deterred irregular
migration.55  To have any deterrent effect, the threat of detention must outweigh
the threat of war and persecution from which the migrants are escaping.56 
Thus, in evaluating the statistics of boat arrivals during the reign of the 
Pacific Solution, one must consider two conditions. First, one must consider
that the conditions of an asylum seeker’s home nation and the ability to obtain 
a valid visa for air travel before seeking refuge in Australia. In turn, it is 
evident that obtaining a valid visa can be more difficult for some migrants 
than others.  A majority of the illegal boat arrivals in Australia were nationals 
of Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries war-torn for decades.57  It can very
 51. Janet Phillips, The ‘Pacific Solution’ revisited: a statistical guide to the asylum
seeker caseloads on Nauru and Manus Island, Department of the Parliamentary Library,
Background Note at 2 (2012), http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_ 
Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2012-2013/PacificSolution [https://perma.cc/
GN9N-W8AW].
52. Lacertosa, supra note 5, at 332. 
53. Phillips, supra note 51, at 13. 
 54. John Menadue, The Pacific Solution didn’t work before and it won’t work now, 





 57. See generally Griff Witte, Afghanistan War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Oct. 
14, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War#toc292843 [https://perma.cc/
H8WS-XYML] (“The joint U.S. and British invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 was preceded 
by over two decades of war in Afghanistan.”); see generally Iraq War, ENCYCLOPEDIA
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well be that migrants from these nations did not have the luxury of obtaining 
valid visas before fleeing their homelands and sought the quickest means
of escape possible. 
Second, one must also consider political stability in areas where many 
of the asylum seekers came from, including Afghanistan.58  Notably, the
implementation of the Pacific Solution came shortly after the events of
September 11, 2001, which contributed to the removal of the Taliban from 
power in Afghanistan.59  The overall effect was a global decline in Afghan 
asylum seekers, a forty-five percent reduction in refugee resettlement 
around the globe, and a drop in the international refugee population by 1.5
million people.60 Perhaps then, the decrease in boat arrivals during the Pacific
Solution can be partially attributed to the overall decline of migrants from 
nations such as Afghanistan which gained some political stability during 
that time.
In February 2008, newly elected Prime Minister Kevin Rudd ended the
Pacific Solution61 and developed new framework for processing asylum 
claims on Christmas Island for migrants arriving by boat.62  In arriving at 
this decision, Rudd’s administration cited high costs and called the program 
unsuccessful.63  Following the end of the Pacific Solution, boat arrivals began
to increase. In 2008, seventy boats carrying 161 passengers arrived.64  In 
2009 the number increased to 60 boats carrying 2,726 passengers, and in 
2010 it reached 134 boats carrying 6,555 passengers.65 
The increase in migration during these years, however, coincided with 
an increase in global political instability.  For example, in 2007, American 
troops surged in Afghanistan, contributing to the outflow of refugees.66  By
February of 2009, the American troop count in Afghanistan had reached
BRITANNICA (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War  [https://perma.cc/
E522-RGZQ] (discussing the history of conflict in Iraq beginning in the 1990’s). 
58. Menadue, supra note 54; Jabour, supra note 19. 
59. See generally Griff Witte, Afghanistan War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Oct. 
14, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War#toc292843 [https://perma.cc/
H8WS-XYML] (“Kandahar, the largest city in southern Afghanistan and the Taliban’s spiritual 
home, fell on December 6 [2001], marking the end of Taliban power.”). 
60. Jabour, supra note 19. 
61. Phillips, supra note 51, at 3.
62.  Ariane Rummery, Australia’s “Pacific Solution” draws to a close: The last 21 
Sri Lankan refuges on Nauru leave for Australia, signaling the end of Australia’s “Pacific
Solution,” UNHCR (Feb. 11, 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2008/2/47b04d074/
australias-pacific-solution-draws-close.html [https://perma.cc/JG35-XR9P].
63. Lacertosa, supra note 5, at 332. 
64. Phillips, supra note 51, at 3.
 65. Id.
 66. Menadue, supra note 54. 
380
ROAM (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2018 3:54 PM      
 


























   
 





   
[VOL. 19:  371, 2018] Future of Australia’s Pacific Solution 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
38,000 and by December of the same year it had soared to almost 100,000.67 
As discussed above, facing massive instability and war, migrants from these 
countries may not have been able to obtain proper documentation for air 
travel and migrants may have been forced to travel by boat, risking detention 
to flee persecution. 
Rudd was ousted as Prime Minister in 2010 by his Deputy Prime 
Minister, Julia Gillard, following a leadership challenge.68 Bolstered by 
the reports of casualties at sea of people attempting to reach Australian soil 
by boat, Gillard sought to reinstate offshore processing of asylum seekers.69 
B. The Malaysia Solution
In 2011, Gillard announced her policy, “The Malaysia Solution.”70 In 
this regard, Gillard attempted to invoke section 198A of the Migration Act 
1958 (“Migration Act”), which at the time, allowed the Immigration
Minister to name Malaysia a “declared country,” where an offshore entry
person could be taken.71 Under this solution, 800 people who had arrived
at Australia by boat would be sent to Malaysia in exchange for 4,000 
“genuine” refugees, those who had already been granted refugee status.72 
This exchange was aimed at sending the message that attempting to reach
Australia illegally by boat would result in being sent to the “back of the 
queue” for processing in Malaysia.73  By deterring would-be migrants from
 67. CNN Library, Operation Enduring Freedom Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 5, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/28/world/operation-enduring-freedom-fast-facts/ [http://
perma.cc/4UH8-VKPM].
68. Kate Lyons, Australian party leadership challenges: a brief history of spills, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/sep/
14/australian-party-leadership-challenges-brief-history-of-spills [http://perma.cc/76ZP-GHBL].
69. Lacertosa, supra note 5, at 333. 
70. Gillard announces the Malaysian Solution, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 7,
2011), http://www.smh.com.au/national/gillard-announces-malaysian-solution-20110507­
1ed0h.html [hereinafter Malaysian Solution].
71. See Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minster for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244
CLR 144, para. 11 (Austl.) (available at http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/showCase/2011/ 
HCA/32). This amendment created section 198A under the Migration Act 1958 which was 
later repealed under the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and
Other Measures) Act 2012. See Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) 
(Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.).
72. Malaysian Solution, supra note 70. 
73. Id.; Pastore, Anthony, Comment, Why Judges Should Not Make Refugee Law:
Australia’s Malaysia Solution and the Refugee Convention, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 615, 617– 
618 (2013). 
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undertaking the dangerous boat journey to Australia, the agreement was 
intended to reduce human smuggling.74  Gillard described the solution as 
a “big blow” to people smugglers.75 
However, the Australian High Court struck down the Malaysia Solution 
the same year it was proposed in Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration 
and Citizenship (“Plaintiff M70”).76  The plaintiffs in the case were two 
Afghan nationals who arrived at the Australian territory of Christmas Island
by boat that had sailed from Indonesia.77  Both plaintiffs claimed to have
a well-founded fear of persecution in Afghanistan on grounds that would 
qualify them as refugees under the Refugees Convention.78  However, under 
the Malaysia Solution, because the plaintiffs arrived by boat at Christmas
Island, an excised offshore location, and lacked visas, they were classified
as an offshore entry person and subject to detention.79 
Once detained and subject to removal to Malaysia under Australia’s 
new Malaysia Solution, they filed suits to stop their removal.80  Plaintiffs 
argued the only source of power to remove them from Australia was in section
198A of the Migration Act.81  However, that power was conditioned on
the Immigration Minister making a valid declaration of the country to which 
they were to be removed.82  Plaintiffs alleged that the declaration made 
was not valid because Malaysia did not meet the criteria under section 
198A(3) of the Migration Act.83 
The High Court of Australia ruled in a six to one decision that the proposal
to send unwanted asylum seekers to Malaysia was illegal because it contravened
section 198A of the Migration Act.84  The Court interpreted the criteria 
laid out in section 198A(3) as being intended to satisfy Australia’s international 
 74. Bergeron, Claire, Current Development: Developments in the International Field: 
Australia Enacts New Refugee Law After High Court Halts “Malaysia Plan”, 26 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 202 (2011).
75. Malaysian Solution, supra note 70. 
76. Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minster for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144,
para. 68 (Austl.), http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/showCase/2011/HCA/32. 
77. Id. at para. 3. 
78. Id.
 79. Id. at para. 5. 
80. Bergeron, supra note 74, at 204. 




 84. Ting Walker, The High Court decision on the Malaysian Solution, AUSTRALIAN
BROADCASTING CORP. (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/11/23/
3374312.htm [https://perma.cc/7JXH-Q6RY]; see Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minster for
Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144, para. 68 (Austl.).
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obligations under the Article 33(1) of the Refugees Convention85 which 
prohibits “refouling,”86 the process of transferring migrants to a place where
they may be at risk of human rights violations including inhuman or degrading 
treatment.87  In its decision, the Court noted: 
Malaysia is not a party to the [1951] Convention [Relating to the Status of
Refugees]. It does not recognize, or provide for the recognition of, refugees in its 
domestic law.  It therefore does not provide any procedures for the determination
of claims to refugee status . . . Malaysia does not bind itself, in its immigration 
legislation, to non-refoulement.88 
The Court held that since Malaysia has not bound itself to the principles
of the Refugees Convention, and it neither participates in the Refugees
Convention, nor provides refugee protection through its domestic laws, it 
could not guarantee there would be no refoulement of refugees sent from
Australia.
C. Rebirth of the Pacific Solution—Gillard’s Workaround 
After the Court buried the Malaysia Solution in Plaintiff M70, Gillard 
assembled an Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers.89 The panel was tasked with 
proposing a new solution to asylum seekers arriving by boat.90  The panel 
released its report on August 13, 2012.91  In its first recommendation, the
panel identified the need for short, medium and long-term priorities in
reshaping Australian policymaking toward asylum seekers.92  It further
 85. Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minster for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR
144, para. 66 (Austl.); Bergeron, supra note 74, at 204. 
86. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150 (“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”).
87. Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 16. 
88. Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minster for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144,
¶ 249 (Austl.).
89. Lacertosa, supra note 5, at 335. 
90. Id.
 91. Ian McCluskey, Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers and regional 




92. GOV’T OF AUSTRALIA, REPORT OF THE EXPERT PANEL ON ASYLUM SEEKERS
(2012) at 14, available at http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/thebordercrossingobservatory/ 
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recommended an expansion of Australia’s Humanitarian Program to increase
the number of refugees Australia would resettle.93  Most importantly, it
advocated reviving the Pacific Solution by re-opening the processing centers
in Papua New Guinea and Nauru to act as a short term “circuit breaker” to 
the surge of irregular maritime arrivals94 urging policymakers to enact
“legislation to support the transfer of people to regional processing
arrangements.”95 
Armed with the Expert Panel’s recommendations, the Australian government 
resumed debate on the Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing 
and Other Measures) Bill 2011, which had been introduced in the House 
of Representatives on September 21, 2011.96  This debate led to the passing
of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other
Measures) Act 2012 (“Regional Processing Act”) on August 17, 201297 and 
subsequent re-designations of Nauru and Papua New Guinea as regional 
processing countries.98 
III. DOES THE PACIFIC SOLUTION VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
A. The Problem with the 2012 Amendments to the Migration Act
The Regional Processing Amendment modified several provisions of the 
Migration Act.99  Most notably, the Regional Processing Act made it mandatory
—rather than permissible as was the language in the 2001 amendment—for 
officers to detain any unlawful non-citizen found in an offshore excised
place.100 It also became mandatory for an officer to remove an offshore entry 
files/2015/03/expert_panel_on_asylum_seekers_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNE9-PPNY]
[hereinafter Report of the Expert Panel].
93. Id.
 94. Id. at 47–49. 
95. Id. at 15. 
96. McCluskey, supra note 91. 
97. See Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures)
Act 2012 (Cth) (Austl.).
98. See Instrument of Designation of the Republic of Nauru as a Regional Processing
Country Under Subsection 198AB(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Austl.) (dated Sept.
10, 2012); see also Instrument of Designation of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea
as a Regional Processing Country Under Subsection 198AB(1) of the Migration Act 1958
(Cth) (Austl.) (dated Oct. 9, 2012). 
99. See generally Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other 
Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) (Austl.).
100. Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) 
Act 2012 (Cth) sch. 1 div 8 sub-div B s 198AD(2) (Austl.); Migration Act 1958, div 7, sub-div A,
s 189 (Austl.).
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person (now referred to as an “unauthorised maritime arrival”) to a regional
processing country.101 
The Regional Processing Act also repealed section 198A of the Migration 
Act,102 which laid out the criteria for declaring a country eligible for offshore
processing.103 As previously discussed, the court in Plaintiff M70 relied 
upon section 198A in finding illegal the declaration of Malaysia as an offshore 
processing country.  It held section 198A necessarily incorporated Australia’s 
obligations under the Refugee Convention104 and that Malaysia had not
bound itself to or complied with those obligations.105  The repeal of section 
198A eliminated the constraints of the Refugees Convention in naming
a particular country as a “regional processing country.”106 
However, seemingly in acknowledgment of Australia’s obligations 
under the Refugees Convention, the Regional Processing Act also added 
section 198AA to the Migration Act as follows:107 
a.	 people smuggling, and its undesirable consequences including 

the resulting loss of life at sea, are major regional problems that need
 
to be addressed; and 

b.	 offshore entry persons, including offshore entry persons in respect 

of whom Australia has or may have protection obligations under
 
the Refugees Convention as amended the Refugees Protocol, 

should be able to be taken to any country designated to be a regional
 
processing country; and 

c.	 it is a matter for the Minister and Parliament to decide which
 




101. Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) 
Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 div 8 sub-div B s 198AD(2) (Austl.); Migration Act 1958, pt 2 div 8,
sub-div B, s 198AD(2) (Austl.). 
102. Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) 
Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 div 8 sub-div A (Austl.).
103. See Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) 
Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1 1 s 198A (Austl.). 
104. See Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minster for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244
CLR 144, ¶ 118 (Austl.). 
105. See id. at ¶ 249.
106. Under the 2012 amendment, a “designated country” is now referred to as a “regional 
processing country. See Migration Act 1958, div 8, sub-div B, s 198AB (Austl.). 
107. Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) 
Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 div 8 sub-div B s 198AA (Austl.). 
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d.	 the designation of a country to be a regional processing country
 
need not be determined by reference to the international obligations 

or domestic law of that country.108
 
Essentially, section 198AA eliminated both the need for the regional 
processing country to be a signatory to the Refugees Convention and the 
incorporation of similar provisions of the Refugees Convention into its 
domestic laws.  By including this new language, the Australian government
acknowledged its obligations under the Refugees Convention, yet did not 
require the regional processing country to uphold those obligations.  Hence,
the section provided an effective way to skirt around the issue identified
by the court with the Malaysia Solution. 
The Regional Processing Act further created section 198AB of the Migration 
Act and provided guidance on naming a regional processing country.109 
The only condition for naming a regional processing country is the Minister’s
finding that it is in the national interest.110  In considering the national interest,
the Minister “must have regard to whether or not the country has given Australia 
assurances” that there will be no refoulement111 and that the country will
determine a person’s refugee status based on the definition of “refugee” in
Article 1A of the Refugees Convention.112 
However, section 198AB also provided that “the assurances . . . need not 
be legally binding.”113 So, despite the fact that both Nauru and Papua New
Guinea are signatories to the Refugees Convention,114 once Australia outsourced 
the processing of asylum claims to these countries, it had no obligation to 
ensure that the spirit and provisions of the Refugees Convention were upheld. 
In contrast, the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European
 108. See Migration Act 1958, (Cth) pt 2 div 8, sub-div B, s 198AA (Austl.);
Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012
(Cth) sch 1 div 8 sub-div B s 198AA (Austl.). 
109. See Migration Act 1958, (Cth) pt 2 div 8, sub-div B, s 198AB (Austl.).
110. Migration Act 1958, (Cth) pt 2 div 8, sub-div B, s 198AB (Austl.). 
111. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.S.T.
6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”).
112. Migration Act 1958, (Cth) pt 2 div 8, sub-div B, s 198AB (Austl.); Migration
Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1
div 8 sub-div B s 198AB(3)(a) (Austl.). 
113. Migration Act 1958, (Cth) pt 2 div 8, sub-div B, s 198AB (Austl.); Migration
Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1
div 8 sub-div B s 198AB(3)(a) (Austl.). 
114. Nauru acceded to the Convention on June 28, 2011 and Papua New Guinea acceded
to the Convention on July 17, 1986. See U.N.T.C., https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/V63H- 
6HH5] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
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Court of Human Rights hold that where a State exercises “effective control” 
over a person extraterritorially, the person will be subject to the State’s
jurisdiction and relevant human rights obligations will apply.115  While, 
the Australian government accepted that, where it is exercising “effective 
control,” its human rights obligations may apply “extraterritorially,”116 it 
nevertheless, went to great lengths to carefully tailor legislation to avoid 
oversight responsibility.
The duties of the Australian government under the Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MOU”) with Nauru—the document that permits the transfer
of migrants to Nauru—demonstrate that Australia is exercising effective
control over the asylum seekers it transfers to the Nauru processing center.
The High Court of Australia noted that under the MOU, the Australian
government agreed to lodge visa applications for transferees with the Nauruan 
government.117  Moreover, the Australian government agreed to bear the
costs associated with the MOU and it was the Australian government that
contracted for the construction and maintenance of the processing center
on Nauru, in accordance with the MOU.118  Furthermore, only the Australian
government can submit applications for transferee visas and the Australian
government occupies an office at the processing center to carry out functions 
related to the Nauru center and its transferees.119  In fact, under the agreements
with Nauru, the Australian government is tasked with providing many services 
at the center including security, cleaning, and catering.120  Therefore, because
if its effective control, the Australian government cannot relieve itself of its
international obligations to asylum seekers simply by transferring them to
another nation.
B. The Problem with the Policy Justification and its Procedures 
The stated purpose of the Pacific Solution is to address the undesirable 
consequences of people smuggling, including deaths at sea.121  But, what the 
Australian government fails to realize is that by implementing a harsh
policy aimed at deterring boats, it is indirectly penalizing those passengers
 115. Report of the Expert Panel, supra note 92, at 82. 
116. Id.
 117. Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016]
HCA 1, para. 3 (Austl.), http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/showCase/2016/HCA/1. 
118. Id. at ¶ 3, 7. 
119. Id. at ¶ 9, 13.
120. Id. at ¶ 10, 12. 
121. See Migration Act 1958, div 8, sub-div B, s 198AA (Austl.). 
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Shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees
who, coming directly from another territory where their life or freedom was threatened . . .
enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal 
entry or presence.”122 
Under the Pacific Solution, asylum seekers arriving by boat (unauthorised 
maritime arrivals), are considered unlawful non-citizens and are required
to be detained123 and relocated to a regional processing country.124 
Furthermore, the Migration Act specifically states that, “[a]n application 
for a visa is not a valid application if it is made by an unauthorised maritime 
arrival who is in Australia and is an unlawful citizen.”125 
Moreover, in 2013, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd took the stance that
no asylum seeker who arrived by boat to Australia would have any chance 
at being resettled in Australia as a refugee.126  By prohibiting any review
of asylum seekers’ status as refugees and instead immediately sending them
to Nauru—with no chance of ever being resettled in Australia—the would-be 
refugees are penalized on the basis of their “illegal” mode of entry. The
Refugees Convention expressly prohibits such penalization. 
Regardless of their mode of entry, if migrants are found to be genuine 
refugees, their fate should not be arbitrarily determined based on their mode
of migration.  The fact that some refugees arrive by boat—a costly and 
dangerous endeavor—may indicate their situation is more dire than those
who can arrive by a safer option.127  The Refugee Council of Australia found 
that from 2010 through 2011, 89.6% of asylum seekers who arrived by boat 
were found to be refugees compared to only 43.7% of those who arrived with
valid visas.128 
122. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6223, (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954), art. 31 (Austl.). 
123. Migration Act 1958, div 7, sub-div A, s 189 (Austl.).
124. Migration Act 1958, div 8, sub-div B, s 198AD (Austl.). 
125. Migration Act 1958, div 3, sub-div AA, s 46A (Austl.). 
126. Aust will never accept boat people: Rudd, SPECIAL BROADCASTING SERVICES
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/07/19/aust-will-never-accept­
boat-people-rudd [https://perma.cc/JDV6-XT66].
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C. Questionable Conditions of the Processing Centers
The conditions of the processing centers may also put Australia in violation 
of international law. Article 33 of the Refugees Convention prohibits 
“refoulement,”129 which means the Australian government cannot transfer
migrants to places where they may be at risk of human rights violations 
including inhuman or degrading treatment.130  This principle is echoed in
ICCPR Article 7 and the UDHR Article 5, which provide that “[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”131  The UDHR also provides in Article 25 that “[e]veryone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being
of himself and of his family . . . .”132 
Amnesty International found that, between September 2012 and September 
2016, 531 people were repatriated from Nauru and Manus Island to countries
such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Syria; all common
source countries for refugees.133  Amnesty International pointed out that
“[g]iven the abysmal conditions on Nauru, it is doubtful whether these 
departures were truly voluntary,”134 implying that refoulement had indeed
taken place.
Australia and Nauru impose strict secrecy regarding the detention centers, 
refusing most requests by journalists or researchers to visit Nauru.135  However, 
in July 2016, researchers from Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch entered Nauru without disclosing information about their organizational
affiliations.136  Once there, they witnessed the conditions first-hand, interviewed 
129.  Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 268. 
130. Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 16. 
131. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 7 (Dec. 16, 1966); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 
5 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
132. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 25 (Dec. 10, 1948).
133. Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 23. 
134. Id.
135. There is an $8,000 non-refundable visa fee for journalists and Nauru granted 
visas to only two media outlets from January 2014 to July 2016. See Australia: Appalling 
abuse, neglect of refugees on Nauru, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 2, 2016, 11:30 AM), https:// 
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/australia-abuse-neglect-of-refugees-on-nauru/
[https://perma.cc/L9RQ-MH9B] [hereinafter Neglect of Refugees].
136. Id.
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1. Detainees Suffer Severe Mental Anguish and Engage in Self-Harm 
Amnesty International reported that the feelings of no clear future and 
no appropriate medical care resulted in high rates of poor mental health
among detainees on Nauru.139  During the July 2016 interviews, detainees
reported suffering “severe anxiety, inability to sleep, mood swings, prolonged
depression, and short-term memory loss . . . .”140 
Amnesty International also found that self-harm and attempted suicides 
were commonplace among Nauru’s refugee and asylum-seeking population.141 
For example, in April 2016, a 23-year old Iranian refugee set himself on
fire, reportedly shouting, “This is how tired we are, this action will prove 
how exhausted we are. I cannot take it anymore.”142  The young man later 
died in an Australian hospital.143  One month later, a 21-year old Somali refugee
also set herself on fire, sustaining serious burns to 70% of her body, but 
surviving.144 
A Pakistani man attempted suicide in both May and July 2016 saying, 
“I’d rather die than continue living here.”145  An Iranian man recounted
an event where his pregnant wife unsuccessfully tried to hang herself.146 
An Iraqi man told researchers, “I cannot go back.  But here I am dying a 
thousand times.  In Iraq you get just one bullet or bomb, and it’s over, and 
here I am slowly dying from the pain.”147  The anguish is not limited to adults;
children are also displaying the symptoms.  For example, a 13-year old 
Afghan boy has attempted suicide three times including attempting to 
drown himself at sea.148 
This pattern of self-harm resulting from the mental breakdown of detainees 
indicates that Australia is in violation of the Refugees Convention, the ICCPR, 
and the UDHR.  The Australian government has knowingly and forcefully
placed asylum seekers in an environment that has proven to have severe




See Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 8. 




Neglect of Refugees, supra note 135. 
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left with few options: stay in Nauru and suffer there, repatriate to their home
nations and suffer there, or end their lives—and the suffering—all together. 
2. Arbitrary Arrests, Police Misconduct, and Indifference 
The ICCPR Article 9 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and 
security of person.  No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”149 
Yet, during its investigation, Amnesty International uncovered evidence 
of arbitrary arrests and police misconduct.150  In one such case, a refugee was
jailed for attempting suicide in April 2016.151  Rather than address the problem
of rampant mental health issues, the Nauruan government criminalized the
actions of those suffering.152  Although Nauru later decriminalized suicide in
May 2016, the law still allows prosecution for actions that took place prior 
to the decriminalization.153 
There are also cases of police indifference and misconduct.  An Iranian 
man was robbed by two drunken Nauruan locals, one in civilian clothes and 
one in a police uniform.154 The man went to the police station multiple 
times to report the theft, but police told him the computer was broken and 
they could not take a report.155  When the man asked the police to write the
report by hand, the police said they had no paper.156  Other refugees have
claimed that police destroyed refugee-prepared statements and instead
forced them to sign statements written by the police.157  Some refugees
have even reported that police have physically assaulted them.158 
Other refugees have complained of physical abuse to the police, but to 
no avail. Detainees have been beaten and robbed and local police have 
allegedly made little or no effort to investigate the attacks.159  Women are 
especially vulnerable to attack; reported incidents of sexual assault include
groping, touching, and attempted rape.160 








 154. Id. at 61. 
155. Id.
 156. Id.




Neglect of Refugees, supra note 135. 
Id.
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In July 2015, Nauru’s former chief justice, Geoffrey Ames, testified before
an Australian Select Senate Committee that “There is a serious question
about [police] independence and about their willingness to investigate 
allegations against Nauruans who are charged with assaults of non-Nauruans.”161 
Prior to his testimony, Ames, an Australian national, was forced out of his
Nauruan judicial office in 2014 when his visa was revoked by Nauruan
authorities.162 Refugees housed on Nauru seem to have little recourse for
invasions of their personal security and may even be targeted by the police; a
condition that is untenable under international law. 
3. Medical Treatment is Inadequate
There are also allegations of insufficient medical care on Nauru.  Medical
services are provided by International Health and Medical Services (IMHS), 
a private company contracted by the Australian government, in addition 
to the services provided by the Republic of Nauru Hospital (RONH).163 
However, migrants have to wait months to see specialists or undergo necessary
tests even when doctors indicate their condition are serious.164  Even further, 
some tests and procedures are not available on Nauru.165  For example, a
thirty-four year old Iranian man who reported having severe pain in his stomach
and legs and bleeding, vomiting, and pain urinating was unable to obtain 
a needed colonoscopy in Nauru.166  When he asked if he had cancer, the
doctors simply replied “maybe,” and that they could not perform any tests.167 
Sometimes, patients’ claims are simply dismissed by medical providers,
as was the case when a young diabetic man went to the IMHS manager after 
inexplicably losing sixty pounds only to be told that such weight loss is 
normal.168 
It also seems that the medical providers are not equipped to handle serious
emergencies.  It reportedly took twenty-six hours to evacuate the young Iranian
man to who set himself on fire in April 2016 to Brisbane for treatment, where
he later died from his injuries.169  Another man recalled that when his wife 
was in labor, the bed in the delivery room did not have a mattress and the 





Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 24–25. 







Neglect of Refugees, supra note 135. 
Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 25. 
Neglect of Refugees, supra note 135. 
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Furthermore, a service-provider explained that it is not authorized to either
call ambulances for refugees or transport them to the hospital because such 
“advocacy” does not help refugees become “independent.”171  Yet, when
refugees attempt to call ambulances themselves, the hospital refuses to send 
one.172 
Overall, the lack of medical services available to refugees puts Nauru 
and Australia in violation of the UDHR which calls for a standard of living 
that is adequate for a person’s health and well-being.
4. Children are Constructively Denied Access to Education 
Access to public elementary education is a right expressly given to refugees 
under the Refugee Convention, Article 22.173 Article 26 of the UDHR also 
states that “[e]veryone has the right to education.”174  Before 2015, a Save
the Children school at the refugee processing center had an estimated ninety 
percent attendance rate.175  However, the school was closed in mid-2015,
so that the building could be converted into office space and recreation
area for detention center staff,176 and refugee children were forced to attend 
local schools where they were bullied, harassed, or physically assaulted by
teachers or local children.177 Within six months of the transition, refugee
children attendance dropped from 60% to 5%.178  Thus, the fear of abuse has
constructively denied refugee children access to the education system.
 171. Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 26. 
172. See id.
 173. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 22, July
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
174. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26 (Dec. 10,
1948).
175. Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 31. 
176. Ben Doherty, School in Nauru Detention Centre to be Closed, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 30, 2015, 3:17 P.M.), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/mar/31/
asylum-seeker-children-start-campaign-to-save-their-nauru-school-from-closure [https:// 
perma.cc/DLZ5-HE4U].
177. Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 31. 
178. Id.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC SOLUTION
A. The High Court of Australia’s Ruling on Nauru
In 2016, proceedings were brought before the High Court of Australia 
challenging the legality of offshore processing in Nauru in the case Plaintiff
M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.179  Plaintiffs
alleged it was illegal for the Australian government to fund and operate 
detention centers in a third country.180  Recall that under the MOU between
Australia and Nauru, the Australian government agreed to bear the costs 
associated with offshore processing.181 
While the case was ongoing, the Australian government hastily passed 
legislation that included a provision specifically allowing the Australian 
government to pay for and participate in matters related to the detention 
of persons held in regional processing countries.182 The legislation, the
Migration Amendment (Regional Processing Arrangements) Act 2015
(“Processing Arrangements Act”), enacted on June 30, 2015, created section 
198AHA of the Migration Act.183  The newly created section applied 
retroactively with an effective date of August 18, 2012.184 Thus, its provisions
were “in force” prior to the signing of the first MOU between Australia and 
Nauru on August 29, 2012.185 
Section 198AHA provides: 
1.	 This section applies if the Commonwealth enters into an 
arrangement with a person or body in relation to the regional 
processing functions of a country. 
179. Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016]
HCA 1, ¶ 110 (Austl.) (available at http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/showCase/2016/
HCA/1 [https://perma.cc/3QB9-S64D]).
180. Elizabeth Byrne & Stephanie Anderson, High Court throws out challenge to
Nauru offshore immigration detention; Malcolm Turnbull vows people smugglers will not 
prevail, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP. (Feb. 8, 2016, 3:03 AM), http://www.abc. 
net.au/news/2016-02-03/high-court-throws-out-challenge-to-offshore-detention/7135504 
[https://perma.cc/P5MA-7W5D].
181. Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016]
HCA 1, para. 3, 7 (Austl.), http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/showCase/2016/HCA/1. 
182. Buchanan, supra note 4; Byrne & Anderson, supra note 180. 
183. Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016]
HCA 1, ¶ 110 (Austl.), http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/showCase/2016/HCA/1 [https://perma. 
cc/3QB9-S64D].
184. Id. at ¶ 68.
185. See id.
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2. The Commonwealth may do all or any of the following: 
a.	 take, or cause to be taken, any action in relation to the 
arrangement or the regional processing functions of the 
country;
b. make payments, or cause payments to be made, in relation
to the arrangement or the regional processing functions 
of the country;
c.	 do anything else that is incidental or conclusive to the taking 
of such action or the making of such payments. 
3.	 To avoid doubt, subsection (2) is intended to ensure that 
the Commonwealth has capacity and authority to take action,
without otherwise affecting the lawfulness of that action. 
4.	 Nothing in this section limits the executive power of the 
Commonwealth.186 
In a six to one decision, the Court held that the Australian government 
is legally able to participate in the detention of asylum seekers in Nauru.187 
In its decision, the Court noted that “Section 198AHA is concerned with the 
regional processing functions of a country declared by the Minister under 
s 198AB(1) as a regional processing country to which UMAs (unauthorised 
maritime arrivals) may be taken under s 198AD(2).”188  The Court found that 
because the MOU is an arrangement relating to the regional processing 
functions of Nauru, section 198AHA(2) authorizes the Australian government
to fund the center and services provided under the MOU.189 
The decision could cause 267 asylum seekers currently in Australia, 
including more than 30 babies who were born in Australia to asylum seeking 
mothers, to be transferred to Nauru.190 The broader effect of this decision
is that the Australian government now has the green light to continue with
offshore processing in Nauru. 
186. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 198AHA (Austl.). 
187. Buchanan, supra note 4. 
188. Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016]
HCA 1, ¶ 42 (Austl.), http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/showCase/2016/HCA/1 [https://perma. 
cc/3QB9-S64D].
189. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 71.
190. Buchanan, supra note 4. 
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B. The Papua New Guinea Supreme Court Ruling 
On April 26, 2016, the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea ruled
the detention of asylum seekers on Manus Island violated their right to personal 
liberty under the Papua New Guinea Constitution.191  The Court explained
that the power to detain, and therefore deprive a person of his liberty, is only
available against persons who have entered or remain in the country without 
a valid entry permit or an exemption.192  Any other deprivation of a person’s
liberty is unconstitutional and illegal.193  The court found that the asylum
seekers on Manus Island had received an exemption pursuant to the MOUs
between Papua New Guinea and Australia.194  Therefore, the asylum seekers
were lawfully in Papua New Guinea and entitled to constitutional protections.195 
In support of this conclusion, the Court stated: 
In the present case, the undisputed facts clearly reveal that the asylum seekers
had no intention of entering and remaining in PNG. Their destination was and
continues to be Australia. They did not enter PNG and do not remain in PNG on
their own accord. This is confirmed by the very fact of their forceful transfer and
continued detention on MIPC (Manus Island Processing Center) by the PNG and
Australian governments. It was the joint efforts of the Australian and PNG
governments that has seen the asylum seekers brought into PNG and kept at the 
MIPC against their will. This [sic] arrangements were outside the Constitutional
and legal framework in PNG . . . . Naturally, it follows that, the forceful bringing
into and detention of the asylum seekers on MPIC is unconstitutional and is
therefore illegal.196 
The Court instructed the governments of Papua New Guinea and Australia to
take all necessary steps to cease and prevent the unconstitutional and illegal 
detention and continued breach of the asylum seekers’ human rights.197 
Following this decision, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister announced 
the facility on Manus Island would close and the Australian government
would have to make alternative arrangements for the asylum seekers held 
there.198 
In response, Australia’s Immigration Minister, Peter Dutton, reiterated that
Australia retained its position that no one attempting to reach Australia by
boat will be permitted to settle in Australia, including those who are currently 
191. Namah v Pato, [2016] PCSC 13; SC1497 (26 Apr. 2016), 5, 27 (Papua N.G.), 
http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGSC/2016/13.pdf [https://perma.cc/D46X-GMFU].
NEWS (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-36136630 [https://perma.cc/ 
192. 
193. 









Id. at para. 39. 
Id. at para. 74(6). 
Papua New Guinea to shut Australia’s Manus Island migrant camp, BBC
9HZK-UH68].
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in the Manus Island facility.199  Australian Prime Minister, Malcom Turnbull, 
proposed legislation “doubling down” on Australia’s stance on boat arrivals.200 
The new legislation, proposed to the parliament by Turnbull in November 
2016, would create a lifetime ban on obtaining an Australian visa for boat 
migrants.201  This ban would apply to all the adult migrants who have been
sent to Nauru or Manus Island since July 19, 2013.202  The bill faced immediate 
opposition by the Labor party, who unanimously voted to oppose it.203 
The Labor party positioned that the ban could make resettlement deals 
harder to secure. For example, New Zealand extended a standing offer to
take 150 refugees per year from the offshore detention centers, but Australia 
rejected the offer over concerns that it could give people indirect access
to Australia.204  Although the visa ban would quell these concerns, it could 
also cause New Zealand to take the deal off the table entirely, because
New Zealand refuses to create second-class citizens, which would occur 
should Australia place a lifetime visa ban on the refugees that New Zealand
takes in.205 
The bill’s legality is also at issue.  Implementation of such a ban would 
mean that a refugee who is resettled and becomes a citizen in a third country, 
such as the United States or Canada, could never return to Australia for
business, tourism or even to visit family.206  A result that critics say would 
199. Press Release, Peter Dutton, Minister for Immigr. & Border Prot., PNG Supreme
Court judgment (Apr. 26, 2016), http://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/peterdutton/2016/Pages/
png-supreme-court-judgement.aspx [https://perma.cc/8S4J-Z74G]. 
200. Australia asylum: Arrivals by boat face lifetime visa ban, BBC (Oct. 30, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-37814496 [https://perma.cc/A8RU-J8ZK]. 
201. Id.; Briefing on Lifetime Visa Ban, REFUGEE COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA (July 11, 
2017), https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/publications/reports/asylum-reports/lifetime-visa- 
ban-bill/ [https://perma.cc/CWZ2-64PH]. 
202. BBC, supra note 200. 
203. Paul Karp, Labor Rejects Government’s Proposed Lifetime Refugee Travel Ban, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2016, 7:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/
2016/nov/08/labor-unanimously-rejects-governments-proposed-lfetime-refugee-travel-ban
[https://perma.cc/WC78-SGSB].
204. Ben Doherty, Peter Dutton Says Getting Women and Children off Nauru is ‘First 
Priority’, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016, 12:17 AM), https://theguardian.com/Australia­
news/2016/sep/20/peter-dutton-says-getting-women-and-children-off-nauru-is-first-priority
[https://perma.cc/P2DQ-3DAH] [hereinafter Doherty, Women and Children First Priority].
205. See Karp, supra note 203.
 206. Michelle Innis, Australia’s Proposed Lifetime Ban on Boat-Borne Refugees Draws
Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/australia/ 
refugee-asylum-seeker-lifetime-ban.html [https://perma.cc/WC78-SGSB] [hereinafter Innis,
Australia’s Proposed Lifetime Ban on Boat-Borne Refugees Draws Fire]. 
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separate families207 and violate Australia’s international human rights obligations
to protect families and children.208 
The ban would also exasperate Australia’s violation of Article 31(1) of 
the Refugees Convention, which, as discussed earlier, prohibits state imposed 
penalties on refugees “on account of their illegal entry.”  Australia is already 
illegally penalizing boat migrants by detaining them.  Imposing the penalty
of a lifetime ban on these same refugees is another clear violation of
international law.
C. The Future of the Detainees on Manus Island and Nauru 
The future of the detainees on Manus Island remains uncertain.  Neither 
the Australian, nor the Papua New Guinea governments, have announced
a timeline for phasing out the Manus Island facility.209  Australia may also 
face complications with its Nauru processing facility because its two major
processing center operators there, Broadspectrum and Wilson Security, 
discontinued services in October 2017.210 
For now, Australia’s short-term plan for both facilities hinges on an 
agreement negotiated with the United States in November 2016.211  Under
the one-off agreement, endorsed by the United Nations, the approximately
1,600 detainees on Manus Island and Nauru will be sent to the United States
for resettlement.212  However, several major obstacles stand in the way of 
this agreement coming to fruition.  First, it is unclear how many refugees 
the United States will actually accept.213  The U.S. State Department’s Bureau
 207. Id. (Critics of the ban include Richard Di Natale, leader of the Australian Greens, 
Bill Shorten, leader of the Labor Party, and Hugh de Krester, a lawyer from the Human Rights
Law Center in Melbourne).
208. Jane McAdams and Ben Saul, Malcolm Turnbull is Breaking International Law
with Cruel Lifetime Refugee Ban, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.
smh.com.au/comment/malcolm-turnbull-is-breaking-international-law-with-cruel-lifetime­
refugee-ban-20161108-gskstx.html [https://perma.cc/8WFF-LZV6]. 
209. Stephanie Anderson, Manus Island detention center to close, Peter Dutton and PNG
Prime Minister confirm, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP. (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.abc.
net.au/news/2016-08-17/manus-island-to-close-png-prime-minister-confirms/7759810 
[https://perma.cc/UUF3-EMEL]. 
210. Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 14. 
211. Robb Stewart, Australia Strikes Deal to Resettle Refugees in U.S., WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 12, 2016, 10:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/australia-strikes-deal-to-resettle­
refugees-in-u-s-1478997228. 
212. Michelle Innis, As Trump Nears Office, Australian Deal to Move Refugees to U.S. 
Is in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/world/ 
australia/australia-us-refugee-deal.html [hereinafter Innis, U.S. Deal is in Doubt] [https:// 
perma.cc/69RA-C3AS].
213.  Eric Tlozek & Stephanie Anderson, Refugee deal: United State cannot speculate
on Trump and refugee deal, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP. (Nov. 20, 2016), http:// 
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of Population, Refugees and Migration did not provide specific numbers,
but stated it had “agreed to consider referrals from the UNHCR,” and that 
it “will determine the size of this program in consultation with the UNHCR.”214 
Second, the timing of the deal is leads to speculation that Australia entered 
into a “people swap” agreement.215  The announcement that the United States
would take refugees from Nauru and Manus closely coincided with another 
announcement that Australia agreed to resettle refugees from a camp in
Costa Rica.216  In this secondary agreement, Australia pledged monetary
support and intake of refugees who fled gang violence in countries like 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.217  However, Australia did not 
specifically grant additional resettlement places for these refugees.218  Thus, 
presumably, the central American refugees will be part of Australia’s annual
intake of 13,750 per year.219  The question then becomes whether this is a
quid-pro-quo situation in which Australia will take the central American
refugees as long as the United States follows through on its pledge to take
the Nauru and Manus Island refugees. 
Third, the United States will likely attempt to rescind or at least skirt its 
obligations under the agreement.220  The original agreement was entered 
into under the Obama administration shortly before his tenure in office ended. 
Obama’s successor, Donald Trump was inaugurated as President of the 




 215. See Jiyoung Song, What do we know about the central American refugee deal 
between the U.S. and Australia?, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/25/what-do-we-know-about-the-central­
american-refugee-deal-between-the-us-and-australia [https://perma.cc/9NQB-KT4J].
U.N., THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016, 6:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/australia­
216. See id. 
217. Id. 
218. Ben Doherty, Australia will take refugees from Costa Rica camps, Turnbull Tells 
news/2016/sep/21/australia-will-take-refugees-from-costa-rica-camps-turnbull-tells-un 
[https://perma.cc/KG96-JR78] [hereinafter Doherty, Refugees from Costa Rica].
219. Australia plans to increase humanitarian intake to 18,750 people per year by
2018-2019. Doherty, Refugees from Costa Rica, supra note 218; Doherty, Women and Children 
First Priority, supra note 204. 
220. Innis, U.S. Deal is in Doubt, supra note 212. 
221. Presidential Inauguration 2017, USA.GOV, https://web.archive.org/web/2017 
0202000105/https://www.usa.gov/inauguration-2017 [https://perma.cc/Z6LX-X77T] (last
visited Feb. 2, 2017). 
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after taking office, President Trump reportedly told Australian Prime Minister 
Malcom Turnbull that the refugee agreement was, “the worst deal ever.”222 
This proclamation came just one day after President Trump signed an
executive order titled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry 
Into the United States,” which called for: (1) a ninety-day suspension on 
entry of people from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen; (2) an 
indefinite ban on the resettlement of Syrian refugees; (3) suspension on
the entry of all other refugees to the United States for 120 days; and (4) an
immediate suspension of the Visa Interview Waiver Program and compliance
with the requirement that all individuals seeking a nonimmigrant visa
undergo an in-person interview.223 
The Executive Order (“Order 13769”) affected all foreign travelers traveling
to the United States, including those traveling for immigration purposes,
those traveling for non-immigration purposes (such as for tourism or
business), and refugees.224 Most notably, Order 13769 indefinitely banned
Syrian refugees until such time that the President “ha[s] determined that 
sufficient changes have been made the USRAP (U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program) to ensure that admission of Syrian refugees is consistent with 
the national interest.”225 
Order 13769 faced implementation problems in its first few days.  There 
was some initial confusion over whether the Order applied to permanent 
residents as well as refugees.  Initially, White House officials said the Order 
applied to green card holders from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Yemen requiring a case-by-case waiver to return to the United States.226 
The next day, however, White House officials backtracked and said it would 
not affect green card holders, but only travelers from the targeted countries 
would be subjected to additional screening.227 
There was also uncertainty surrounding the scope of authority granted 
to Order 13769.  On January 28, 2017, the day after the Order was signed, 
222. Greg Miller and Philip Rucker, ‘This was the worst call by far’: Trump Badgered, 




223. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Michael Shear
et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order on Refugees Amid Chaos and Outcry Worldwide, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us­
airports-prompting-legal-challenges-to-trumps-immigration-order.html. 
224. See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
225. Id.
 226. Peter Baker, Travelers Stranded and Protests Swell Over Trump Order, N.Y.
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two Iraqi men228 petitioned the court for a stay of removal.229  The court 
enjoined respondents from removing individuals who: (1) have approved 
refugee applications pending, (2) are holders of valid visas, and (3) other
individuals from the targeted countries who are legally authorized to enter 
the United States.230 
The court found that petitioners “have a strong likelihood of success in 
establishing that the removal of the petitioner . . . violates [his] rights to 
Due Process and Equal Protection guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.”231  Moreover, there is “imminent danger” that “there will be
substantial and irreparable injury to refugees, visa-holders, and other individuals 
from nations subject to the January 27, 2017 Executive Order.”232  The
decision only restricts the removal of affected individuals, falling short of 
barring their detention.233  Other courts across the United States issued
similar orders, some seeming to expand the restriction to bar both removal 
and detention.234 
Eventually, on March 6, 2017, Order 13769 was expressly revoked and 
replaced by Executive Order 13780 (“Order 13780”)235 Order 13780
attempted to clarify the ambiguities of Order 13769.  It provided a country­
by-country analysis as to the named countries in the travel ban and also 
provided guidance as to the scope of the ban.236  Order 13780 imposed a 
temporary pause on the entry into the United States of foreign nationals 
of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen (notably eliminating Iraq from 
228. Mica Rosenberg & Jonathan Stempel, U.S. judges limit Trump immigration
order; some officials ignore rulings, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2017, 1:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-trump-immigration-courts/u-s-judges-limit-trump-immigration-order-some­
officials-ignore-rulings-idUSKBN15D0XG [http://perma.cc/QF3H-2H7X]. 
229. Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 480 (AMD) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (order
granting stays of removal). 




 233. See id.
234. For example, In Boston, on January 29, 2017, U.S. District Judge Allison Burroughs
refugees, visa holders, and permanent U.S. residents entering from the targeted countries. 
Likewise, a court in Virginia blocked the removal of permanent U.S. residents who were 
detained at Dulles International Airport. Rosenberg & Stempel, supra note 228. 
235.  Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13212 (Mar. 9, 2017). 
236. See generally Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13210–13214 (Mar. 
9, 2017). 
 401



























      
 
 
   
    
  
  
the list)237 and again called for a 120-day suspension of the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program,238 with the program officially resuming on October
24, 2017 under Executive Order 13815.239 
Finally, on September 27, 2017, President Trump issued Proclamation 
9645 which added travel restrictions to foreign nationals of Chad, North 
Korea, and Venezuela, in addition to the foreign nationals already listed
in Order 13780.240  Although some of the lower courts enjoined some of
the travel restrictions of Order 13780, the United States Supreme Court 
stayed the injunctions on December 4, 2017, allowing the travel restrictions
of both Order 13780 and Proclamation 9645 to be implemented fully241 
while legal challenges to the restrictions continue to proceed in lower
courts.242 
In light of the President’s tough stance on controlling immigration to the
United States, as demonstrated by the language of his various executive 
orders and proclamation, it is unlikely the United States will resettle all of
Australia’s refugees, many of whom came to Australia from the countries 
targeted by the orders.  Despite the Presidential roadblocks, the United States 
began effectuating the agreement in September 2017, when the State Department 
confirmed that fifty-four approved refugees would be traveling to the
United States from Papua New Guinea and Nauru.243 
A fourth challenge facing Australia is that the United States deal came
only months after the High Court of Australia upheld the legality of the
Nauru facility. But, shopping around for a nation willing to accept the 
refugees from both facilities, the Australian government seems to concede 
that Nauru is not a viable option for resettlement.  In 2015, Nauru’s justice 
minister, David Adeang, indicated Nauru would never be a permanent 
home for the refugees.244  He said that “durable resettlement solutions for 
[Nauru’s] refuges,” was a “critical missing component,” going on to say, “I
237. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13213 (Mar. 9, 2017); Proclamation No.
9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45171 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
238.  Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13215 (Mar. 9, 2017). 
239.  Exec. Order No. 13815, 82 Fed. Reg. 50055, 50056 (Oct. 24, 2017). 
240.  Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45171 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
241. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: NEW COURT ORDER ON PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/ea/new-court-orders- 
on-presidential-proclamation.html [https://perma.cc/6YWG-NKL8]. 
242. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Allows Full Enforcement of Trump Travel Ban 
While Legal Challenges Continue, THE WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-allows-full-enforcement-of-trump-travel-ban- 
while-legal-challenges-continue/2017/12/04/486549c0-d5fc-11e7-a986­
d0a9770d9a3e_ story.html?utm_term=.8f890ce232e1 [https://perma.cc/X5LT-KP4B]. 
243. Jaqueline Williams & Adam Baidawi, In Deal Trump Called ‘Dumb,’ U.S.
Taking 50 Refugees from Australia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/20/world/Australia/refugees-turnbull-trump.html [https://perma.cc/2YAF-RCW8]. 
244. Doherty, Refugees from Costa Rica, supra note 218. 
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encourage states today to assist us find [sic] permanent homes for the 924
refugee men, women and children currently on Nauru.” Rather than accept 
this reality and resettle the refugees in its territory, Australia continues to 
shop for alternative solutions. 
Finally, the Australian government has failed to lay out a long-term plan 
for future migration to its shores, other than the proposed lifetime ban on 
obtaining Australian visas.  The rudimentary “plan” implies the Australian
government intends to keep the Pacific Solution.  But how will this fare 
on the international stage? How long will other nations be willing to take 
refugees off the hands of the Australian government? 
D. The Long-Term Solution to the Pacific Non-Solution 
Offshore processing and detention is not a long-term solution to irregular 
migration. As discussed earlier, offshoring asylum claims to Nauru has
placed Australia in violation of numerous international obligations including:
Articles 22, 31, and 33 of the Refugees Convention; Articles 7 and 9 of the
ICCPR; and Articles 5 and 25 of the UDHR.  In November 2016, a UN 
Special Reporter on migrant human rights declared that conditions on
Nauru were “cruel, inhuman and degrading,” pointing out that “Australia 
would vehemently protest if its citizens were treated like this by other 
countries especially if Australian children were treated like this.”245 
In addition, UDHR Article 14 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to 
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”  Through 
the Pacific Solution, the Australian government has denied this fundamental
right to migrants who arrive by boat seeking asylum in Australia.  The
penalization and discrimination of refugees who arrive by boat should
cease immediately.  Asylum seekers arriving by boat should have their claims
processed in the same manner as asylum seekers who arrive by air. If they
are deemed refugees, then they should receive the same treatment as any 
other refugee in Australia. 
“Irregular maritime arrivals” are no less refugees deserving of the same 
protections as refugees currently arriving with a visa.  In the end, a refugee
is a refugee, regardless of whether he or she arrived by plane or was forced
to make the dangerous journey by boat.  To penalize a refugee simply because








     
 






















Furthermore, continuing to transfer migrants to Nauru places Australia
in violation of Article 15 of the UDHR which provides that “[e]veryone 
has the right to a nationality.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”246  According 
to Amnesty International, the Nauruan government issues identification
documents to refugees, but lists the person’s nationality as “refugee.”247 This
effectively denies refugees of a nationality, leaving them in limbo, forced
to hang in the balance until Australia can convince another country to take 
them in.  They will never be accepted in Australia, but clearly Nauru has not 
accepted them either.
The offshoring process should end, and asylum seekers’ claims should 
be processed in Australia, by Australian officials.  Categorizing migrants 
as regular arrivals or irregular arrivals should stop and anyone found to be 
a refugee should be helped in an equally humanitarian manner. 
If Australia nonetheless decides to continue offshore processing, it should 
conduct the processing in one of its own territories and should provide
complete transparency of the facilities’ operations.  By doing so, Australia 
could take greater control in ensuring humane treatment and adequate living 
conditions in the offshore facilities.
It could also ensure that asylum claims are processed under Australian
law, rather than that of a third country, demonstrating that the Australian
government is willing to take accountability for the treatment of asylum 
seekers.  Australia would be taking ownership of its international human
rights obligations and any violation of domestic or international law would
fall squarely under the jurisdiction of the Australian courts.  There would 
be no more muddying of the water as to whether a violation was attributed 
to the laws of some other nation and the debate over extraterritorial control 
would be silenced. 
Finally, Australia must devise a more concrete plan for the resettlement 
of the refugees rather than leave them in a perpetual state of uncertainty. 
This could be achieved by long-term agreements with sister nations, or by 
simply allowing the resettlement of refugees in Australian territory. 
V. CONCLUSION
The plight of a refugee is one that many of us will never understand.  In 
the inevitable absence of utopian world peace, there will always be people 
who are displaced from their homes and who must flee out of fear of
persecution. The world is currently grappling with a historic number of
246. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15 (Dec. 10, 
1948).
247. Island of Despair, supra note 3, at 23. 
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displaced people.  At the end of 2015, 65.3 million people, equating to one 
out of every 113 people on Earth, were displaced according to the UNHCR.248 
A number that surpasses post World War II numbers.249  Of the people
displaced, 21.3 million are refugees, of which children make up over fifty 
percent.250 
The leading nations of the world cannot turn their backs to these migrants.  
Rather, such nations must uphold their humanitarian obligations and provide 
a safe place for those who have nowhere to go. Otherwise, international
human rights agreements are no more than empty promises that fail to help
establish a world where all people can live with dignity and respect. 
Although Australia’s Pacific Solution may purport to have the best intentions 
in mind, it falls short of upholding Australia’s human rights obligations 
and must end.  By continuing to accept the Pacific Solution, the international 
community is setting a dangerous precedent that could lead to a race to the 
bottom.251  The Australian government touts its policy as a model for other
countries to follow,252 but the policy is rooted in isolating the island nation 
from migration and exporting refugees who have already made the journey. 
If other countries implement similar policies, as the United States has 
through its Executive Orders, Australia will find itself in a buyers’ market
and will continue to struggle to find viable resettlement countries for its 
refugee population.  Its only substantive solution, the agreement with the 
United States, will likely fall short, forcing Australia back to the drawing
board. The time is now for the Australian government to do what it should 
have done already: resettle the refugees from offshore detention centers in
Australian territory and come up with a long-term solution that complies with
international law.
 248. Adrian Edwards, Global Forced Displacement Hits Record High, UNHCR
(June 20, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced­
displacement-hits-record-high.html [https://perma.cc/2V7K-ANPG].
249. Euan McKirdy, UNHCR Report: More Displaced Now Than After WWII, CNN 
(June 20, 2016, 9:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/20/world/unhcr-displaced-peoples- 
report/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z8HM-XZBV].
250. Edwards, supra note 248. 
251. Waleed Aly, Australia’s Poisonous Refugee Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/opinion/australias-poisonous-refugee-policy.html?_r=0 
(“Australia’s policy is a kind of contagion, lowering global standards on refugee policy,
shifting the boundaries of what nations now find acceptable.”) [https://perma.cc/G8YL-28JB]. 
252. Ben Doherty, Malcolm Turnbull tells world leaders to follow Australia’s asylum 
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